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FIXING 404
Joseph A. Grundfest*
Steven E. Bochner**
Although debate persists as to whether the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley's Sec-
tion 404 regulations exceed their benefits, there is broad consensus that the
rules have been inefficiently implemented. Substantive and procedural fac-
tors contribute to the rules'inefficiency.
From a substantive perspective, the terms "material weakness" and "sig-
nificant deficiency" are central to the implementing regulations and are
easily interpreted to legitimize audits of controls that have only a remote
probability of causing an inconsequential effect on the issuer's financial
statements. As a quantitative matter the literature suggests that a control
with a remote probability of causing an inconsequential effect has an ex-
pected value of only five one-hundredths of one percent of a firm's net
income.
Procedurally, the Section 404 rules are implemented in an economic and
political environment that generates a powerful tropism for inefficient
hyperenforcement. Auditors have been broadly criticized for a rash of
audit failures and restatements. They do not want to be further criticized
for implementing Section 404 with insufficient vigor Auditors are also
subject to significant uninsurable litigation risk. That provides an incentive
to externalize risk by forcing clients to absorb greater precautionary costs
that benefit auditors by reducing the probability of an audit failure.
Auditors also make money selling Section 404 services to audit and
nonaudit clients alike. These three forces combine to create powerful
incentives for the audit industry, incentives that contribute to inefficient
expenditures on Section 404 procedures much like the forces that drive
inefficient expenditures on defensive medical procedures.
To address these concerns, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("Commission" or "SEC") and the Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board ("PCAOB") should aggressively redraft the rules
implementing Section 404 to eliminate the need to examine controls that
are unlikely to have a material effect. At the same time, the PCAOB should
monitor audit firms' Section 404 practices and discipline auditors who
promote or engage in cost-inefficient procedures.
* William A. Franke Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School; Co-Director,
Rock Center on Corporate Governance, Stanford University. The author is a former commissioner of
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (1985-1990).
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We are not confident that these or any other reforms will be sufficient to
remedy the problems already created by Section 404. The audit profession
has incorporated inefficient Section 404 procedures into its integrated au-
dit framework, and experience suggests that auditors are loathe to weaken
processes already in place. While the Commission and the PCAOB should
act aggressively to rationalize Section 404 costs, Section 404 as imple-
mented under the current rules may have established an irreversible
process that will continue to impose inefficient costs on publicly traded
firms for years to come.
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INTRODUCTION
It's time to fix the rules that implement Section 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley Act" or "Sarbanes-Oxley").' Section
404 is a delegation of authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission
("Commission" or "SEC") to "prescribe rules" governing management's
internal control reports, and to the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board ("PCAOB") to "set standards for attestation engagements" relating to
management's reports.2 The difficulties arise not in the text of Section 404
but in the structure of the rules adopted by the PCAOB, and approved by the
SEC, implementing Section 404. The specific language of Auditing Stan-
dard No. 2 ("AS2"), 3 which defines the standards for attestation referenced
in the statutory text, was a product of these rules.
An important political point deserves emphasis at the outset. There is
nothing inherently wrong with the language of Section 404 as enacted by
Congress. It is entirely possible for strong supporters of Sarbanes-Oxley to
1. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. IV 2004).
2. Id.
3. AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN CON-
JUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, Auditing Standard No. 2 (Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd. 2004) [hereinafter AS2], effective pursuant to Order Approving Proposed
Auditing Standard No. 2, Exchange Act Release No. 49,884, 69 Fed. Reg. 35,083 (June 17, 2004).
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be vigorous opponents of Section 404 as implemented by the PCAOB and
the SEC through AS2. This Article's critique is directed entirely at AS2.
Resolution of these problems will not require Congressional action because
the PCAOB and the Commission can implement all necessary and appropri-
ate amendments at the administrative level.
While there is substantial debate over the costs and benefits of Section
404 as implemented by AS2, there is far greater consensus that the
PCAOB's rules are not cost effective in the sense that a very large portion of
Section 404's benefits can be generated while imposing substantially lower
costs on the economy. Consistent with this view, the head of the PCAOB
has stated that "it is ... clear to us that the first round of internal control
audits cost too much."5
The cost of Section 404 compliance seems to have surprised the very
regulators who put the rules in place. A recent study found that the direct
cost of implementing Section 404 in its first year averaged about $7.3 mil-
lion for companies with market capitalizations in excess of $700 million and
about $1.5 million for issuers with market capitalizations of $75 million to
$700 million.6 The SEC initially estimated the average cost of complying
with Section 404 at approximately $91,000.7 First-year implementation
4. For a recent summary of the argument that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in general,
and Section 404 in particular, have imposed heavy burdens on the economy, see, for example,
HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE'VE
LEARNED; HOW TO Fix IT (2006). For a strong assertion that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in general, and
Section 404 in particular, are "the principal factor[s] in increased costs" faced by publicly traded
firms and generate a situation in which the "costs of regulation clearly exceed its benefits for many
corporations," see William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of
"Going Private," 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 141-42 (2006). For an argument that the implementation of
Section 404 has created harmful unintended consequences, see Alex J. Pollock, Undoing SOX's
Unintended Consequences, TCS DAILY, May 25, 2006, http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?
id=052506D. See also Donna Block, Agency attempts to clarify SOX burdens, THE DEAL, July 13,
2006 (quoting Representative Tom Feeney as stating that "[t]he high burden of regulation and com-
pliance is outsourcing America's lead in world capital markets," and "[t]he London Stock Exchange
is going around the country advertising itself as a 'SOX-free zone' "). For an example of the oppos-
ing view, suggesting that "Sarbanes-Oxley, for all its reputation as a hard-hitting law, fails to correct
a crucial accounting system weakness: the potential for .. . 'moral seduction' of outside auditors,"
see Don A. Moore, SarbOx Doesn't Go Far Enough: Further rules are needed to counter auditors'
natural bias in favor of their clients, Bus. WK., Apr. 17, 2006, at 112. See also Don A. Moore et al.,
Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction and Strategic Issue
Cycling (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 03115, 2005).
5. PCAOB, PCAOB Issues Guidance on Audits of Internal Control, May 16, 2005,
http://www.pcaobus.org/news-and-events/news/2005/05-16.aspx (quoting Chairman William J.
McDonough). As a technical matter, the optimal implementation of Section 404 regulations would
equate the rules' marginal social benefit of compliance with their marginal social cost. It is therefore
entirely possible for one to believe that Section 404 rules generate aggregate benefits in excess of
their costs but that the Section 404 rules are nonetheless socially wasteful because they force expen-
ditures beyond the level at which marginal benefits equal marginal costs. The proposal described in
this paper presents just such a set of recommendations. For a more complete treatment of this sub-
ject, see Section III, infra.
6. CRA INT'L, SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 COSTS AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES: SUR-
VEY UPDATE 5-6 (2005) [hereinafter SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 COSTS AND IMPLEMENTATION
ISSUES].
7. Management's Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8238, 68 Fed. Reg.
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costs for larger companies were thus eighty times greater than the SEC had
estimated, and sixteen times greater than estimated for smaller companies.
This observation raises additional questions about the fundamental cost-
benefit calculus underlying Section 404's implementing regulations. If, at
the time of the rules' adoption, regulators believed that AS2 would generate
benefits in excess of projected costs, by how much did they expect benefits
to exceed costs? Did they believe that benefits would exceed costs by some
modest amount, or did they actually believe that AS2's benefits would range
from sixteen to eighty times greater than its expected costs? It follows that,
unless regulators believed that AS2 would generate benefits enormously in
excess of its projected costs-a proposition entirely unsupported by the re-
cord-the standard has sorely disappointed its drafters. AS2 may stand as
one of the greatest failures of cost-benefit analysis in the history of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission.
The debate over Section 404's cost effectiveness is not limited to its
first-year implementation costs.' While Section 404 start-up costs were quite
high and second-year compliance costs appear to be lower, there is signifi-
cant dispute over the magnitude of second-year cost declines. Data
generated in a study supported by the audit industry suggest that average
second-year Section 404 compliance costs for smaller companies were
$900,000, or 39% less than first-year costs, and that second-year compliance
costs for larger companies averaged $4.3 million, or 42% less than first-year
implementation costs.9 In contrast, a study by Financial Executives Interna-
tional found that "total average cost for Section 404 compliance ... during
fiscal year 2005 [was] down 16.3 percent from 2004," and suggests that
these reductions were only "about half of what were anticipated"' and about
half of the magnitude of the cost declines reported by the audit industry's
sponsored study.
While news of reduced Section 404 compliance costs was no doubt wel-
come, the simple observation that costs have declined addresses neither the
core cost-benefit question nor the cost-efficiency concerns raised by the Sec-
36,636, 36,657 (June 18, 2003) [hereinafter Management's Reports] ("Using our PRA [Paperwork
Reduction Act] burden estimates, we estimate the aggregate annual costs of implementing Section
404(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to be around $1.24 billion (or $91,000 per company)."). To be
sure, this estimate relates only to Section 404(a) and not to Section 404(b), but it is hard to conceive
that the stand-alone costs of Section 404(b) compliance would dramatically change the Commis-
sion's cost analysis.
8. The actual cost-benefit calculus as it relates to Section 404 is more complicated than this
simple ratio test suggests. Section 404 compliance involves large start-up costs and lower subse-
quent maintenance costs. Similarly, first-year benefits of Section 404 should also be greater than
benefits generated in subsequent years. A complete cost-benefit analysis would consider the full
lifecycle costs and benefits of the Section 404 rules and would discount those costs and benefits
accordingly.
9. SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 COSTS AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES, supra note 6, at
6-7.
10. FEI Survey: Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance Costs are Dropping; Average Compliance
Costs are $3.8 Million, Down 16% from Prior Year; Reductions About Half of What Were Antici-
pated, PR NEWSWIRE Ass'N, Apr. 6, 2006, http://www.pmewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?
ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/04-06-2006/0004335523&EDATE=.
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tion 404 rules. In particular, just as first-year implementation costs would rea-
sonably be expected to exceed second-year costs, first-year implementation
benefits would also be expected to exceed second-year benefits." The avail-
able surveys do not, however, quantify first- or second-year benefits in a form
that supports any clear inference as to whether Section 404 is more or less
cost effective in its second year than it was in its first.
Further, assuming that the audit industry's more aggressive estimates of
cost declines are correct, these declines are from a very high base. The audit
industry's estimate of second-year compliance costs for the average firm
still runs about 9.5 times greater than the Commission's initial estimate for
first-year costs. For larger firms, second-year compliance costs now run
about fifty-two times the Commission's initial expectations. These data sug-
gest that Section 404's second-year implementation costs remain quite
inefficient in comparison with the SEC's initial expectations. Just as it is
widely appreciated that "the first round of internal control audits cost too
much,"'2 there is a high likelihood that the second round of internal control
audits also cost too much. Absent fundamental reform, the third, fourth, and
fifth rounds are also likely to cost too much, ad infinitum.
How and why did such a gap arise between expected and actual costs?
What, if anything, can be done to bring Section 404 costs more in line with
the regulators' own initial expectations? Responding to both questions calls
for a detailed examination of the substantive definitions of two terms at the
core of the Section 404 rules-"significant deficiency" and "material weak-
ness"-as well as a nuanced appreciation of the procedural environment in
which these rules were initially adopted and the litigation environment in
which they continue to be enforced.
From a substantive perspective, the root cause of Section 404's cost inef-
ficiency resides in the PCAOB's definitions of the terms "significant
deficiency" and "material weakness" combined with the pre-existing defini-
tion of the term "remote likelihood" as applied to the Section 404 process.
As explained in detail below, these definitions force auditors and registrants
to expend a great deal of effort worrying about issues that are highly
unlikely ever to cause a material misstatement. More precisely, AS2 creates
11. The rationale underlying this proposition is straightforward. In the first year of Section
404 implementation, registrants would likely encounter and rectify their most serious control issues.
The control deficiencies identified in subsequent years would be, in all likelihood, the more modest
sorts of deficiencies that were not identified in earlier implementation cycles, and would likely
generate lesser benefits. Thus, if costs in Section 404's second year of implementation were only
half of first-year costs, but if benefits were only a quarter of first-year benefits, then Section 404's
cost-benefit ratio for its second year of implementation could actually be twice as bad as it was in
Section 404's first year of implementation.
12. PCAOB, supra note 5.
13. Although both the SEC and PCAOB rules are technically concerned with the defined
term "internal control over financial reporting," for the sake of brevity this Article refers simply to
"internal controls." As a technical matter, "internal control over financial reporting" comprises only
that subset of internal controls addressed in the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission ("COSO") report which relates to financial reporting objectives. See Man-
agement's Reports, supra note 7, at 36,638-41.
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an incentive for auditors to examine processes that arise at the borderline of
the remote and the inconsequential, processes that have an expected value
impact as low as five one-hundredths of one percent of an issuer's net in-
come. Indeed, the technical definitions of "significant deficiency" and
"material weakness" produce a rather clear roadmap of how and why Sec-
tion 404 compliance costs have mushroomed out of control, far beyond the
Commission's initial aggregate $1.2 billion estimate.' 4 Until these core defi-
nitions are amended to draw auditors' and registrants' attention out of the
weeds and to force a focus on processes that are likely to have a material
effect on a registrant's financial statements, the Section 404 process will
continue to be unnecessarily wasteful.
5
From a procedural perspective, the audit industry is subject to three dis-
tinct incentives to push Section 404 compliance to a point of socially
inefficient hypervigilance. First, the audit industry has been broadly criti-
cized for a rash of audit failures and restatements16 and does not want to be
further criticized for failing to implement Section 404 with sufficient vigor.
As a result, auditors are encouraged to interpret the rules' ambiguities in an
expansive manner so as to require more heightened vigilance. Second, the
litigation environment has a significant in terrorem effect, and auditors are
subject to significant uninsurable litigation risk. Section 404 provides audi-
tors the opportunity to externalize a portion of that risk by forcing audit
clients to absorb greater precautionary costs that redound to the auditors'
benefit by reducing the probability of an audit failure. Put another way, by
forcing clients to spend more money on Section 404 compliance, auditors
can reduce the risk that they will be sued because of an audit failure. Third,
auditors make money providing Section 404 audits to audit clients and sell-
ing Section 404 services to nonaudit clients. All else being equal, the more
onerous the Section 404 compliance efforts, the more money the audit pro-
fession can earn.
None of this is intended to criticize the audit profession as being unique
in any material respect. Indeed, the profession's conduct can be viewed as a
rational response to the environment in which it operates, and many profes-
sions can be criticized on quite similar grounds. Physicians, for example, are
often accused of practicing unnecessarily expensive defensive medicine be-
14. See id. at 36,657.
15. The history of the terms "significant deficiency" and "material weakness" is worthy of
consideration. As discussed in greater detail below, both terms were contained in generally accepted
auditing standards as they existed prior to enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and nothing in the
Act required the PCAOB to redefine those concepts. The PCAOB, however, decided that the two
concepts should be revised to "promote increased consistency in evaluations." AS2, supra note 3,
E78. In light of subsequent experience with the impact of the newly-adopted definitions, the
PCAOB may determine that the usage of these terms should once again be modified in order to
avoid undue cost and inappropriate attention to immaterial matters.
16. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Big Auditing Firm Gets 6-Month Ban on New Business, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2004, at Al; Larry Dignan, After Andersen, accounting worries stick, CNET
NEWS.COM, June 17, 2002, http://news.com.com/After+Anderson%2C+accounting+wonies+stick/
2100-1017_3-936813.html; Enron: Lessons from the External Auditors, CAE BULL., Dec. 7, 2001,
http://www.theiia.org/CAE/index.cfm?iid=21 1.
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cause of the litigation environment in which they operate, 7 and the audit
profession's reaction to the Section 404 rules can be analogized to a finan-
cial form of defensive medicine. The natural "defensive medicine" forces set
in place by Section 404 cannot, however, be constrained unless the PCAOB
follows through with its recent public statements and restrains audit firms
from pursuing overly aggressive Section 404 implementations, just as it pe-
nalizes them for inadequate attention to Section 404.
The SEC and PCAOB can best reduce the cost inefficiency currently
embedded in the Section 404 compliance process through a fundamental
redefinition of the key terms that are at the core of AS2 combined with a
vigorous procedural inspection program designed to deter hypercompliance.
This Article develops the argument as follows. Part I summarizes the short
but complex historical evolution of Section 404 and its implementing regu-
lations. Part II reviews a set of basic economic concepts relating to cost-
benefit analysis that help explain how and why Section 404 has been pushed
far beyond the point of economic rationality. Part III describes the issues
raised by the core definitional provisions of AS2-"material weakness" and
"significant deficiency"-and offers a "substantive fix" for these problems.
Part IV describes the issues raised by audit firm incentives in implementing
AS2 and offers a "procedural fix" for these problems. Part V expands on the
particular problem faced by smaller issuers confronting the relatively high
fixed costs imposed by Section 404. We conclude by offering observations
about the viability of reforming AS2, including the possibility that it may be
impossible to turn back the sands of time and refashion AS2 so that it gener-
ates benefits in excess of its costs. While regulators should do all they can in
an effort to regain that balance, there is room for skepticism as to whether it
can be achieved. If this skepticism proves correct, then Section 404 will be a
permanent and unjustified burden on the capital formation process in the
United States, and it will continue to impose unnecessary costs on issuers
and shareholders alike.
Early versions of this Article were circulated broadly at the SEC and
PCAOB. Subsequently, the SEC and PCAOB announced proposed amend-
ments to AS2 that would implement all of this Article's central
recommendations. We provide a postscript that describes these more recent
developments and briefly discusses the extent to which these developments
may in fact help resolve the inefficiencies generated by AS2.
I. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF SECTION 404
Section 404(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC to promul-
gate rules requiring companies reporting under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), other than registered investment
companies, to include in their annual reports
17. See, e.g., Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?,
Il1 Q.J. ECON. 353 (1996); David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Special-
ist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 1. Am. MED. ASS'N 2609 (2005).
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an internal control report, which shall-(l) state the responsibility of man-
agement for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control
structure and procedures for financial reporting; and (2) contain an as-
sessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer
for financial reporting. 
8
Section 404(b) further required the company's independent auditors to attest
to and report on this management assessment. Under this directive, on June
5, 2003, the SEC adopted the basic rules implementing Section 404. These
rules were designed to be phased in over several years based predominantly
on the size of the issuer. Today, all but nonaccelerated filers are obliged to
comply with the requirements of Section 404.'9
On June 17, 2004, the SEC issued an order approving the PCAOB's
AS2. This standard, titled "An Audit of Internal Control over Financial
Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of the Financial State-
ments," established the requirements that apply to an independent auditor
when performing an audit of a company's internal controls. 2' The rules
adopted by the SEC require management to base its evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of internal controls on a suitable, recognized control framework
established by a body that has followed certain procedures, including distri-
bution of the framework for public comment. While no particular
framework is mandated, the SEC and PCAOB have specifically identified
the internal control framework published by the Committee of SponsoringS 22
Organizations of the Treadway Commission ("COSO") as suitable, and
this framework has emerged as the dominant one applied by U.S. compa-
nies. The COSO framework identifies the components and objectives of
internal control audits, but it does not contain general guidance as to the
steps management must follow in assessing the effectiveness of such con-
trols.
Since its well-intended adoption, the actual implementation of Section
404 by companies and their auditors has been characterized by significant
cost overruns and intense criticism. For example, on July 6, 2006, SEC
Commissioner Paul S. Atkins observed that Section 404 can serve to im-
prove the quality of financial information, but acknowledged that it is also
"cited as the law's most costly provision because of the excessive way in
18. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. IV 2004).
19. Nonaccelerated filers are generally defined to mean reporting issuers with an aggregate
market value of common equity held by nonaffiliates of less than $75 million. Cf 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12b-2 (2006).
20. Order Approving Proposed Auditing Standard No. 2, Exchange Act Release No. 49,884,
69 Fed. Reg. 35,083 (June 17, 2004).
21. Id.
22. AS2, supra note 3, 14.
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which accountants and management have implemented it. '23 And while the
actual costs incurred far exceeded those anticipated for companies of all
sizes, costs in relation to revenue have been disproportionately borne by
24
smaller public companies.
The SEC took a number of preliminary steps designed to address the
problems encountered during the first year of Section 404's implementation.
On March 23, 2005, the SEC chartered an Advisory Committee on Smaller
Public Companies (the "Advisory Committee") to assess the current regula-
tory system for such companies under the securities laws and to make
recommendations for changes in a number of areas, including internal con-
trol assessments and audits 5 On April 13, 2005, the SEC held a roundtable
discussion concerning the implementation problems under Section 404. It
responded to the feedback received from the roundtable by offering guid-
26
ance in the form of a policy statement. The policy statement included the
following observations:
Although it is not surprising that first-year implementation of Section 404
was challenging, almost all of the significant complaints we heard related
not to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or to the rules and auditing standards im-
plementing Section 404, but rather to a mechanical, and even overly
cautious, way in which those rules and standards apparently have been ap-
plied in many cases. Both management and external auditors must bring
reasoned judgment and a top-down, risk-based approach to the 404 com-
pliance process. A one-size fits all, bottom-up, check-the-box approach
that treats all controls equally is less likely to improve internal controls and
financial reporting than reasoned, good faith exercise of professional
21judgment focused on reasonable, as opposed to absolute, assurance.
In a parallel statement issued on the same day, the PCAOB urged
auditors to
exercise judgment to tailor their audit plans to the risks facing individ-
ual audit clients, instead of using standardized "checklists" that may not
reflect an allocation of audit work weighted toward high-risk areas (and
weighted against unnecessary audit focus in low-risk areas);
23. Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks Before the International Corporate Gov-
ernance Network l1th Annual Conference (July 6, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2006/spch07O606psa.htm.
24. ADVISORY COMM'N ON SMALLER PUB. Cos., SEC, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 32-34 (2006), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf [hereinaf-
ter FINAL REPORT].
25. See Notice of establishment of the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 8514, Exchange Act Release No. 50,864, 69 Fed. Reg. 79,498 (Dec. 16,
2004); Notice of first meeting of SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 8560, Exchange Act Release No. 51,417, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,699 (Mar. 23, 2005).
26. Press Release, SEC, Commission Statement on Implementation of Internal Control Re-
porting Requirements (May 16, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-74.htm.
27. Id.
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use a top-down approach that begins with company-level controls, to
identify for further testing only those accounts and processes that are, in
fact, relevant to internal control over financial reporting, and use the
risk assessment required by the standard to eliminate from further con-
sideration those accounts that have only a remote likelihood of
containing a material misstatement; [and]
take advantage of the significant flexibility that the standard allows to
use the work of others.28
Subsequently, in its "Report on the Initial Implementation of Auditing
Standard No. 2," issued on November 30, 2005, the PCAOB found that
"both firms and issuers faced enormous challenges in the first year of im-
plementation, arising from the limited timeframe that issuers and auditors
had to implement Section 404; a shortage of staff with prior training and
experience in designing, evaluating, and testing controls; and related strains
on available resources., 29 Accordingly, "audits performed under these diffi-
cult circumstances were often not as effective or efficient as Auditing
Standard No. 2 intends."30 Among the "most common reasons why audits
were not as efficient as the Board expects them to be" were the findings that
"[slome auditors did not effectively apply a top-down approach [and] ...
did not alter the nature, timing, and extent of their testing to reflect the level
of risk[;] [a]s a result, some auditors appeared to have expended more effort
than was necessary in lower-risk areas.'
The November 30 report also attempted to clarify and reinforce the
meaning of some of the text of AS2 by observing that
[t]he objective of an audit of internal control is to obtain reasonable assur-
ance as to whether any material weaknesses exist. An important corollary
to this fundamental principle is that the standard does not require auditors
to search for deficiencies other than material weaknesses. Further, the
standard does not re-define materiality for the purposes of auditing internal
control.... This means that the auditor should plan and perform the audit
of internal control using the same materiality measures as the auditor uses
to plan and perform the annual audit of the financial statements.
2
Notwithstanding these observations, the November 30 report recognized
that "[a]necdotal claims have suggested that some auditors applied a more
stringent threshold to the evaluation of control deficiencies than the defini-
tions in Auditing Standard No. 2 require."" More fundamentally, however,
28. PCAOB, supra note 5.
29. PCAOB, RELEASE No. 2005-023, REPORT ON THE INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF AUDIT-
ING STANDARD No. 2, AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED
IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 1 (2005), available at
http://www.pcaobus.orglRules/Docket_014/2005-11-30_Release_2005-023.pdf [hereinafter PCAOB
RELEASE No. 2005-023].
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2-3.
32. Id. at 15-16 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 16.
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the November 30 report failed to confront the reality that AS2 states that a
material weakness can arise as the consequence of the cumulative effect of a
set of less significant deficiencies 34 and that the text of the standard itself
therefore compels a search for control deficiencies that are, in and of them-
selves, submaterial.
The difference between the policy statements and reports issued by the
SEC and PCAOB and the text of AS2 is quite striking in many respects.
These statements and reports suggest a sensible approach to the audit of
control systems in which auditors avoid processes that are unlikely to be
material. In contrast, the text of AS2 is rife with language that, as a practical
matter, requires audit procedures that test the boundaries of the inconse-
quential and remote.
Thus far, the additional regulatory guidance has appeared to do little to
address the inefficiencies of a Section 404 audit. The perception that the
initial regulatory releases and public statements have failed to improve the
efficiency of Section 404 audits sets the stage for the later consideration of
more significant measures, including the amendment of AS2 itself, as dis-
cussed below.
The Advisory Committee issued its Final Report to the SEC in April
2006 after thirteen months of fact finding and deliberation, including oral
testimony from a wide variety of market participants and evaluation of hun-
dreds of written comments. The Final Report contained thirty-three
recommendations in the areas of capital formation, accounting, corporate
governance, disclosure, and internal controls.35 In its discussion of Section
404, the Advisory Committee highlighted the disproportionate costs im-
36posed by AS2 on smaller public companies. The Final Report
recommended partial or complete exemptions from Section 404 require-
ments for smaller public companies under specified conditions, including
enhanced corporate governance standards, "[ulnless and until a framework
for assessing internal control over financial reporting for such companies is
developed that recognizes their characteristics and needs.
' 3 7
In April 2006, the Government Accountability Office issued a Report to
the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. The Re-
port recommended that in considering the concerns of the Advisory
Committee, the SEC should assess the available guidance to determine if
additional action was needed, noting that implementation and assessment
efforts were largely driven by AS2. 39 The following month, in testimony
34. See AS2, supra note 3, 10.
35. For a discussion of the definition of smaller public company recommended by the Advi-
sory Committee, see FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 14-19.
36. Id. at 32-35.
37. Id. at 43, 48.
38. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: CONSIDERATION OF KEY
PRINCIPLES NEEDED IN ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTATION FOR SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES 52-53
(2006).
39. Id.
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before the House Committee on Small Business, Representative Nydia M.
Veldzquez highlighted the disproportionate burden of Section 404 on small
firms, noting that compliance costs approach three percent of revenue for
40
some companies and urging Section 404 relief for small companies. In
May 2006, Congressman Tom Feeney introduced the Compete Act to reduce
the burdens associated with the implementation of Section 404.4 If adopted,
the Compete Act would provide an exemption from auditors' internal con-
trol assessment requirements for smaller public companies along the lines
recommended by the Advisory Committee. The Act would alter the standard
for review in internal control audits from a remote likelihood standard to an
objective de minimus standard of five percent of net profits. And the Act
would direct the Commission and the PCAOB to promulgate specific guide-
lines for measuring the terms "reasonable," "significant," and "sufficient" in
the context of internal control audits.
More recently, there has been a flurry of regulatory and other develop-
ments intended to address continued criticism regarding the inefficient
implementation of Section 404. On May 1, 2006, the PCAOB released a
statement announcing that a key area of emphasis in their 2006 inspections
of accounting firms' internal control audits would be the efficiency of such
audits, defined as whether the objectives of AS2 were being achieved with
the least expenditure of effort and resources. 42 Areas of focus include,
among other matters, the degree to which internal control and financial
statement audits were performed as a single, integrated process and whether
a risk-based approach was used in formulating the audit.43 A few weeks later,
the PCAOB announced a four-point plan to improve the internal control
audit process that, significantly, included possible amendments to AS2.4
One amendment under consideration would "clarify[] the definitions of sig-
nificant deficiency and material weakness in internal control. 45 These new
developments are steps in the right direction. However, if, as we contend,
key definitions in AS2 are so flawed as to make the pursuit of the objectives
of the standard inherently inefficient, then the SEC and PCAOB must sub-
stantively amend these definitions, rather than merely clarify them, in order
to achieve their policy objectives. More specifically, the contemplated
amendments must change the fundamental definitions in a way that elimi-
40. Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: What is the Proper Balance Between Investor Protection
and Capital Formation for Small Public Companies?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small
Bus. Democrats, 109th Cong. (2006), http://www.house.gov/smbiz/democrats/Statements/2006/
st050306.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2007) (statement of Rep. Nydia M. Vel1izquez, Ranking Democ-
ratic Member, House Comm. on Small Bus.).
41. Compete Act, H.R. 5405, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
42. Press Release, PCAOB, Board Issues Statement Regarding 2006 Inspections (May 1,
2006), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/News and Events/News/2006/05-0la.aspx.
43. Id.
44. Press Release, PCAOB, Board Announces Four-Point Plan to Improve Implementation
of Internal Control Reporting Requirements (May 17, 2006), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/
News-andEvents/News/2006/05-17.aspx.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
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nates the perceived need to test near the levels of remoteness and inconse-• • 46
quentiality.
Also in May 2006, the SEC announced further steps designed to im-
prove the implementation of Section 404. These steps included the issuing
of a concept release, discussed below, offering guidance concerning internal
control assessments. To ensure that its guidance is helpful to smaller public
companies, the Commission intends to make its guidance scalable, as rec-
ommended by the Advisory Committee.47
The May 2006 announcement and other recent statements by SEC offi-
cials make clear that the Commission intends to address the Advisory
Committee's recommendation by promulgating a more cost-effective stan-
dard rather than through an exemption for smaller public companies. While
noting the forthcoming guidance from the SEC, the PCAOB, and COSO
concerning Section 404, John White, director of the SEC's Division of Cor-
poration Finance, stated in a speech on May 25, 2006, "that it looks as if the
,unless and until' condition suggested by the Advisory Committee [as an
alternative to an exemption] will be met, and the Commission has indicated
that it does not intend at this time to extend a permanent exemption to• ,,41
smaller companies. Mr. White also commented on the need to amend
AS2: "After the second [Section 404] Roundtable earlier this month, and
consideration of extensive public comments, the Commission and the
PCAOB now agree that the PCAOB should amend AS 2 [sic], in part to
fully reflect the earlier guidance in the standard itself."
49
On May 16, 2006, COSO released a response to the recommendations of
the SEC Advisory Committee suggesting that forthcoming guidance would
address the Committee's concerns regarding the inefficiency and lack of
scalability of current guidance. 50 The additional COSO guidance was issued
46. For an argument supporting a change in definitions such as that suggested in the Com-
pete Act, see Pollock, supra note 4 ("In an essential reform, the Compete Act would direct the SEC
and PCAOB to change the audit review standard from 'other than a remote likelihood,' which has
caused Sarbanes-Oxley to be everywhere associated with nitpicking and trivial paperwork, to a
reasonable 'material weakness' criterion.").
47. Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Next Steps for Sarbanes-Oxley Implementation
(May 17, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-75.htm. As foretold by that
announcement, the SEC recently postponed Section 404 implementation again for nonaccelerated
filers from fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 2007, to fiscal years ending on or after December
15, 2007, with respect to the management assessment; and to fiscal years ending on or after Decem-
ber 15, 2008, with respect to the outside auditor attestation. Press Release, SEC, Further Relief from
the Section 404 Requirements for Smaller Companies and Newly Public Companies (Dec. 15,
2006), available at http://www.iasplus.com/usa/0612sox404sme.pdf.
48. John W. White, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Remarks Before the SEC Institute 21st
Annual Mid-Year SEC Reporting Forum: Section 404: The Need for Input (May 25, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch052506jww.htm.
49. Id.
50. See Letter from Larry E. Rittenberg, Chairman, Comm. of Sponsoring Org. of the
Treadway Comm'n, to Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, & John White, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin.,
SEC (May 16,2006).
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in June 2006." While the COSO response is helpful in providing general
guidance for smaller public companies in applying the COSO framework, it
does not address the root cause of the inefficiencies experienced in imple-
menting Section 404.
The SEC issued its Section 404 concept release on July 11, 2006.52 The
concept release was intended as a prelude to forthcoming guidance designed
to improve the implementation of Section 404 " and defined the general ar-
eas likely to be addressed in the course of Section 404 reform, including the
use of company-level controls to address risk within an organization, im-
provement of evaluation procedures, and clarification of documentation
requirements. In the press release accompanying the concept release, the
SEC's then-acting Chief Accountant, Scott Taub, noted: "The guidance we
issue should help companies further improve and streamline their processes
for assessing the effectiveness of internal controls. We intend for the guid-
ance to be flexible and scalable, such that it will assist companies of all
sizes. 54 The press release also reiterated the SEC's intention to work with
the PCAOB to amend AS2. The concept release discussed this intention fur-
ther: "[Biased on feedback received, a number of the implementation issues
arose from an overly conservative application of the Commission rules and
AS No [sic] 2, and the requirements of AS No. 2 itself, as well as questions
regarding the appropriate role of the auditor."55
In the concept release, the SEC further expressed the belief that addi-
tional guidance following the comment period and revisions to AS2 "may
help reduce or eliminate the excessive testing of internal controls by improv-
ing the focus on risk and better use of entity-level controls. 56 Although the
concept release did not provide detail on how AS2 might be amended, Ques-
tion 25 requested public comment on whether guidance would be helpful
regarding the definitions of the terms "material weakness" and "significant
deficiency.'5 7 This Article answers that question in the affirmative but argues
that mere guidance will not resolve the inherent inefficiencies resident in the
core definitions themselves. More serious surgery is required to accomplish
the objective of improving the implementation of Section 404, and the terms
"material weakness" and "significant deficiency" must be dramatically rede-
fined if the Section 404 process is to have any chance of being reengineered
to strike a reasonable cost-benefit balance.
51. COMM. OF SPONSORING ORG. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, INTERNAL CONTROL OVER
FINANCIAL REPORTING-GUIDANCE FOR SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES (2006).
52. Concept Release Concerning Management's Reports on Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting, Exchange Act Release No. 54,122, 71 Fed. Reg. 40,866 (July 11, 2006) [hereinafter
Concept Release].
53. Press Release, SEC, SEC Moves Forward on Sarbanes-Oxley 404 Improvements (July
1I, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-112.htm.
54. Id.
55. See Concept Release, supra note 52, at 9.
56. Id. at 22.
57. Id. at 23.
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The nation's two major trading markets have also commented on the
harm caused by an overly conservative implementation of Section 404.
Robert Greifeld, president and CEO of NASDAQ, has written that the "con-
stant refrain I hear [from international entrepreneurs] is that when it comes
time to do an IPO, they will be reluctant to list on American markets," due
in large part to Sarbanes-Oxley s Greifeld has also noted that "[o]ur re-
search has shown that the burden on small companies [from Sarbanes-
Oxley], on a percentage of revenue basis, is 11 times that of large compa-
nies. '59 According to a New York Stock Exchange working group, "[c]urrent
implementation of SOX 404 is putting the US capital markets at a competi-
tive disadvantage as the largest capital raising activities are taking place
outside the United States due to cumbersome and costly regulations."' 60 The
working group identified the definitions in AS2 as one of the culprits: "The
current definition regarding 'reasonable assurance' in Accounting Standard
No. 2 with the focus on 'remote likelihood' is causing auditors to test con-
trols at the lowest of levels with no real benefit being derived.,
61
II. BASIC COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The problems generated by AS2 are readily illustrated by reference to
classic cost-benefit analysis. Assume that it is possible to rank order all audit
control procedures from most valuable to least valuable-where value is
measured in terms of the marginal benefit generated by that control pro-
cess-and that controls are in fact implemented in sequence from most
valuable to least valuable.62 "Top-down" planning for control audits, a
process that is now strongly advocated by the Commission and the PCAOB,
should naturally generate sequences of this sort.6' Assume also that the costs
of each of these audit processes can be normalized so that each control is
composed of a certain number of "control equivalents," each of which has a
58. Bob Greifeld, It's Time To Pull Up Our SOX, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2006, atA14.
59. Id.
60. NYSE Working Group, Observations and Recommendations to Improve SOX 404,
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/RecommendationstolmproveSOX404.pdf.
61. Id.
62. Marginal costs and benefits are measured here from a social perspective, that is, the
extent to which the control generates costs and benefits to shareholders and all other stakeholders in
the process. By defining costs and benefits in terms of social cost and benefit, the analysis includes
effects on constituencies other than the corporation and its shareholders, such as employees who
might become unemployed or auditors who might suffer financial losses in the event of a controls-
related financial failure.
63. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Commission Statement on Implementation of Internal
Control Reporting Requirements (May 16, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-
74.htm; PCAOB, RELEASE No. 2005-009, POLICY STATEMENT REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF
AUDITING STANDARD No. 2, AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PER-
FORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, 2, 8-9 (2005), available at
http://www.pcaob.com/Rules/Docket_008/2 0 0 5- 0 5-16_Release-2005-009.pdf.
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constant dollar cost. 64 The costs generated by the 404 process would then be
linear in the number of "control equivalents" implemented through an audit
process. By construction, it follows that a graph describing the total benefits
generated by the Section 404 process, where controls are implemented in a
sequence of declining marginal returns, will show diminishing marginal
returns to the number of controls implemented because the control with the
greatest marginal benefits will be the first to be implemented. It also follows
that a graph describing the costs generated by the Section 404 process will
be linear in the number of control equivalents because the total cost of
implementing any number of "control equivalents" is a constant function of
the number of "control equivalents" being implemented.
Figure 1 describes just such a set of hypothetical costs and benefits for
Section 404 and AS2.6' Basic economics teaches that the auditors and the reg-
istrant should only implement controls that fall to the left of the point n in
Figure 1, that is, the point at which the marginal benefit of implementing a
control equals its marginal cost.66 By construction, every control to the left of
this point generates marginal benefits greater than the marginal cost of im-
plementing that control, and every control to the right of this point generates
marginal costs that exceed the marginal benefits of implementing that control.
The optimal implementation of a Section 404 process would cause controls to
be implemented to the point n*, but no further. Total social benefits of the Sec-
tion 404 process at the point n* are represented by the distance B in Figure 1.
FIGURE I
ILLUSTRATIVE COST-BENEFIT PROFILE
FOR SECTION 404 CONTROLS
Costs' . .
Beniefits
n* n* n
Number of Sequenced and Normalized Controls
64. For example, if the most valuable control is five times more expensive than the average
control, then that control could be described as generating costs equal to five "control equivalents."
A control that is only a tenth as expensive to implement would then be described as generating a
tenth of an average "control equivalent."
65. For a similar graph see W. Kip Viscusi, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON,
JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 30 (3d ed. 2000).
66. See id. at 29.
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If the audit process continues to force controls beyond the point n*, then
the marginal cost of implementing each of those controls is, by construction,
larger than the marginal benefit generated by those controls. As a conse-
quence, the total social benefit generated by the process will gradually
diminish until the number of controls implemented equals the point n",
where the aggregate benefits generated by the Section 404 process will
equal its costs. While many commentators argue over whether Section 404
costs exceed benefits, Figure 1 makes clear that if society actually imple-
ments Section 404 regulations to the point where the regulations' total costs
equal their total benefits, then society will have already overinvested in the
control process by adopting controls that exceed the optimal arrangement at
the point n*. Simply phrasing the debate over Section 404 in terms of
whether its aggregate costs exceed its aggregate benefits biases the outcome
toward overinvestment in the Section 404 process.
If auditors have an incentive to force clients to adopt control processes
that generate very low levels of marginal benefit, then they may force clients
to adopt controls to a point such as n , where the marginal benefit of the
control to the auditor is close to zero. It is only at the point n*" that the Sec-
tion 404 process ceases to generate additional benefits for auditors in terms
of potential litigation risk reduction in a manner arguably consistent with the
text of AS2. But at that point, the total cost of the Section 404 process ex-
ceeds its benefits by the amount C, and society would be involved in a
massive overinvestment in internal control processes.
Figure 1 helps illustrate and explain four basic points about the Section
404 debate. First, Figure 1 focuses on a simple economic rule that has been
all but forgotten in the sturm und drang over implementing Section 404. The
Commission and the PCAOB should focus on ensuring that the Section 404
process only implements controls up to the point n*. However, as we are
about to demonstrate, the wording of AS2 and the incentives built into the
audit process effectively guarantee that the process will be pushed beyond
this point of optimality, possibly even toward a point approaching n**.
Second, while it is entirely understandable that much of the debate has
been framed in terms of the total costs and benefits generated by Section
404 and AS2, to conduct the debate on these terms is essentially to concede
that the process is already suboptimal because total costs may not equal total
benefits until the number of controls implemented exceeds the point at
which marginal cost equals marginal benefit.
Third, because the audit profession largely decides the number of con-
trols to be audited, and because the audit profession can apply its own
private calculus to the computation of marginal costs and benefits, the audit
profession has the ability to drive the number of controls to a point where
the private marginal benefits to the profession equal the private marginal
costs to the profession. This point can be far beyond the point at which so-
cial marginal costs equal social marginal benefits, or even the point at which
total social costs equal total social benefits.
Fourth, as the Commission's chairman has recently noted, there is much
room for improvement at the Commission in the application of cost-benefit
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analysis to the rulemaking process.67 The challenges encountered with Sec-
tion 404 may serve as an excellent starting point for self-analysis by the
Commission and by the PCAOB as to how both agencies might improve
their application of cost-benefit principles to the audit process.
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE Fix
While the goal of the Section 404 process is to obtain reasonable assur-
ance that no material weaknesses exist as of the date of management's
assessment, the definitions applied by AS2 require, as a practical matter, that
auditors also assess the presence of "significant deficiencies." AS2 asserts
that a combination of significant deficiencies can constitute a material
weakness. An auditor therefore cannot reasonably conclude that no material
weaknesses are present unless the auditor has also searched for significant
deficiencies and evaluated those significant deficiencies to determine
whether, when aggregated, they constitute a material weakness. Identifying
and assessing significant deficiencies, in turn, requires that auditors identify
and assess myriad control deficiencies that do not individually constitute
significant deficiencies. The result is a cascade downward from the material,
through matters that are merely "more than inconsequential," to matters that
do not even reach the threshold of inconsequentiality, all in an overzealous
effort to identify controls that might, in fact, be material.
The rules thus have an embedded incentive that drives the search not
only for material weaknesses but also for less important "significant defi-
ciencies," notwithstanding exhortations by the PCAOB that auditors should
focus on material weaknesses. 68 Further, given the standards that are com-
monly applied by the audit profession, it is not unreasonable to approximate
the lower limit of a "significant deficiency" as being triggered by a value
that can be measured as five one-hundredths of one percent of a company's
net profits (or of any other quantitative performance measure). We do not
suggest that every Section 404 audit has actually pursued the search for sig-
nificant deficiencies that reside at these extreme borders of remoteness and
inconsequentiality. We merely observe that this incentive is deeply embed-
ded in the very definitions at the core of AS2. Unless and until these
definitions are changed or AS2 is otherwise amended or superceded, the
root problem that drives and legitimizes the process' inefficiencies is not
likely to be fixed.
A. A Precise Definition of the Problem
Auditors must issue adverse opinions if they identify material weak-
nesses. 69 AS2 requires auditors to search for material weaknesses, which, as
67. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the Securities Industry Associa-
tion (Nov. 11, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch 111 05cc.htm.
68. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
69. See AS2, supra note 3, 175.
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a practical matter, requires that they search for significant deficiencies and,
below that threshold, control deficiencies generally.
A significant deficiency is defined as
a control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, that adversely
affects the company's ability to initiate, authorize, record, process, or re-
port external financial data reliably in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles such that there is more than a remote likelihood that
a misstatement of the company's annual or interim financial statements
that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or detected.7 °
The definition includes a note clarifying that "[a] misstatement is inconse-
quential if a reasonable person would conclude, after considering the
possibility of further undetected misstatements, that the misstatement, either
individually or when aggregated with other misstatements, would clearly be
immaterial to the financial statements., 7' The import of this language is dif-
ficult to overstate. The note expressly explains that unless the auditor can
reasonably reach the affirmative conclusion that the potentially aggregated
misstatements, including the possibility of further undetected misstatements,
would clearly be immaterial, then a significant deficiency must be found
whenever the likelihood is greater than remote. This is, of course, in many
instances a difficult conclusion to reach, and experience has shown that this
standard can lead to the identification of vast numbers of significant defi-
ciencies.
A material weakness is defined as "a significant deficiency, or combina-
tion of significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood
that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements
will not be prevented or detected. 72 Here again, because material weak-
nesses can arise through the aggregation of significant deficiencies, auditors
must inquire not only at the high level of presumptive materiality but well
down into the weeds to ascertain which combination of significant deficien-
cies might aggregate to have a material effect.
The usage of these terms in the promulgation of AS2 is striking when
compared with their usage in generally accepted auditing standards as they
existed prior to enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. AU Section 325 of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Professional Standards
("AU 325"), "Communication of Internal Control Related Matters Noted in
an Audit," provided guidance in identifying and reporting conditions relat-
ing to an entity's internal controls observed during an audit of financial
statements.73 AU 325 employed the concepts of "reportable conditions" and
"material weaknesses." Reportable conditions were broadly defined as
70. Id. 9.
71. Id.
72. Id. 10.
73. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDIT-
ING STANDARDS (INCLUDING STATEMENTS ON STANDARDS FOR ATTESTATION ENGAGEMENTS) AU
§ 325 (2001).
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matters coming to the auditor's attention that, in his judgment, should be
communicated to the audit committee because they represent significant
deficiencies in the design or operation of internal control, which could ad-
versely affect the organization's ability to record, process, summarize, and
report financial data consistent with the assertions of management in the
financial statements.74
A material weakness was defined as
a reportable condition in which the design or operation of one or more of
the internal control components does not reduce to a relatively low level
the risk that misstatements caused by error or fraud in amounts that would
be material in relation to the financial statements being audited may occur
and not be detected within a timely period by employees in the normal
course of performing their assigned functions."
Under the preexisting standards, "reportable conditions" were deficien-
cies judged by the auditor, in its experience and discretion, to be worthy of
reporting to the audit committee, rather than deficiencies that cross the hair-
trigger threshold of "more than remote and ... more than inconsequential,"
as per the new AS2 concept. Likewise, the preexisting standards set the like-
lihood threshold for the presence of a material weakness at a "relatively low
level," rather than at the more stringent AS2 threshold of "more than re-
mote." AS2 thus introduced a major innovation through its definitional shift
away from preexisting auditing standards. Congress did not require this in-
novation in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
The quantitative implications of these definitions also bear close consid-
eration. The audit profession has further clarified the term "inconsequential"
as used in AS2's definition of significant deficiency as relating to
"[p]otential misstatements equal to or greater than 20% of overall annual or
interim financial statement materiality," subject to the proviso that even
smaller amounts can be considered as more than inconsequential "as a result
of the consideration of qualitative factors, as required by AS 2.' '76
Therefore, if one begins with the common assumption that a 5% change
in net income 7 or in some other quantifiable accounting measure is material,
then the audit industry's definition of "inconsequential" suggests that a 1%
change (which amounts to 20% of 5%) in an annual or interim financial
statement line item may be the dividing line between consequential and in-
74. Id. AU § 325.02 (emphasis added).
75. Id. AU § 325.15 (emphasis added).
76. A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING CONTROL EXCEPTIONS AND DEFICIENCIES 15 (2004),
available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us assur_Framework-Version3%281%29.pdf
(version 3).
77. Studies suggest "widespread use of a 'rule of thumb' of five to ten percent of net in-
come" as an objective measure of materiality. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg.
45,150, 45,152 (1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm (citing FIN. Ac-
COUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 2:
QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 167 (1980), available at
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con2.pdf). However, SAB 99 rejects exclusive reliance on a quantitative test
for determining materiality.
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consequential-subject, of course, to the proviso that items can certainly be
material at levels lower than 5% and that items can also be consequential at
levels lower than 1%. Accordingly, the 1% test would seem to define the
upper bound of inconsequentiality.
The term "remote likelihood" is defined to have "the same meaning as
the term 'remote' as used in Financial Accounting Standards Board State-
ment No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies ('FAS No. 5').y,78 Paragraph 3 of
FAS No. 5 explains:
When a loss contingency exists, the likelihood that the future event or
events will confirm the loss or impairment of an asset or the incurrence of
a liability can range from probable to remote. This Statement uses the
terms probable, reasonably possible, and remote to identify three areas
within that range, as follows:
a. Probable. The future event or events are likely to occur.
b. Reasonably possible. The chance of the future event or events occur-
ring is more than remote but less than likely.
c. Remote. The chance of the future events [sic] or events occurring is
slight.7 9
An event is therefore "'more than remote' when it is either reasonably pos-
sible or probable."'
The PCAOB has expressly stated that:
the terms "probable," "reasonably possible," and "remote," should not be
understood to provide for specific quantitative thresholds. Proper applica-
tion of these terms involves a qualitative assessment of probability.
Therefore, the evaluation of whether a control deficiency presents a "more
than remote" likelihood of misstatement can be made without quantifying
the probability of occurrence as a specific percentage."
We put aside for the moment the unassailable fact that probabilities are
mathematical constructs and must therefore correspond to some quantitative
value or range of values. Due to the absence of quantitative guidance, peo-
ple will implicitly assign different quantitative values to the phrases
"reasonably possible" or "remote" or, alternatively, reduce the analysis to
the vagaries of subjective feelings. This variability adds to the difficulties
generated by the definitions at the core of AS2.
These definitions inescapably imply that, in order to determine whether
a company's controls suffer from significant deficiencies, auditors are re-
quired as a practical matter to evaluate a broad spectrum of controls, all the
way down to the border between those that (a) raise a more than remote
78. AS2, supra note 3, 9.
79. Id. (quoting ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 5, 3 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975)).
80. Id.
81. PCAOB RELEASE No. 2005-023, supra note 29.
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likelihood of an immaterial-but more than inconsequential-misstatement
of the company's financial statement, and (b) raise a less than remote likeli-
hood of an inconsequential misstatement. Because it will often be
impossible for auditors to know, ex ante, on which side of that border any
particular control or combination of controls might fall, this process can
easily require the evaluation of many controls that are ultimately determined
to fall below either the remoteness or inconsequentiality thresholds. If we
then import into this analysis the prior observation that the borderline be-
tween consequentiality and inconsequentiality is no more than 1% of net
profit (or of any other objective accounting measure), then auditors must
search for controls near the border between (a) those that raise a more than
remote likelihood of an immaterial-but more than 1%-misstatement of
the company's financials, and (b) those that raise a less than remote likeli-
hood of a 1% misstatement.
Further, if we assume for sake of argument only, and clearly against the
PCAOB's direct instructions, that a probability of 5% or less would consti-
tute a less than remote probability, then the preceding articulation of the
definition of significant deficiencies implies that auditors have cause to
search for any audit control processes with a 5% probability of a 1% impli-
cation for a firm's financial statements. The expected value of a 5%
probability of a 1% impact is only five-hundredths of 1% of net profits, or of
any other objective line-item accounting standard that might be selected.
This is, by any standard, a low threshold of sensitivity for triggering an audit
requirement.
At this point, the game is immediately lost and massive inefficiencies
become hard-wired into the system. It is impossible for an auditor to deter-
mine whether the probability of an event is more or less than remote (say
5%), or whether the consequence of any failure would be more or less than
inconsequential (say 1%), unless the auditor dives deeply into the weeds in
search of the elusive border that distinguishes "more than remote events
with sub-material but more than inconsequential implications" from events
that are too remote or inconsequential to be categorized as a significant defi-
ciency.
Unless and until these definitions are amended, the prospects for mean-
ingful and efficient reform are quite limited because all other modifications
or interpretations of AS2 will relate to a process by which auditors are either
obligated or encouraged to search for low-probability, low-magnitude events
with which they probably should not be concerned in the first instance. Ab-
sent such reform, it becomes inevitable that the Section 404 audit exercise
will generate exceptionally large costs as it addresses a wide range of proc-
esses that will never have a material effect on the company's financial
statements. As former SEC Commissioner Glassman observed, the idea of a
company having 40,000 "key controls" is an oxymoron, and a "check the
box" exercise for Section 404 compliance is "inefficient and ineffective., 2
82. Glassman Says 404 Rules Aimed at Holding Management Accountable, 37 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1738 (Oct. 17, 2005).
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Yet that result appears to be an inescapable consequence of the definitions
inherent in AS2.
Several additional features of the rule compound the problems caused by
AS2's approach to materiality. Bob Pozen underscored three of these fea-
tures in a Wall Street Journal article. 3 First, Pozen observed that the
Commission has defined internal structures and procedures for financial
reporting to include "more items of information with more details than those
ordinarily included in the financial reports of public companies."4 Internal
controls must therefore provide assurances that "receipts and expenditures
of the company are being made only in accordance with authorization of
management and directors of the company.'85 The result, as Pozen observes,
is that "[b]y unlinking 'internal controls' from 'financial reporting' in Sec-
tion 404, the SEC encourages management and auditors to scrutinize
detailed procedures for controlling ordinary expenditures ... even in cases
where they are clearly immaterial to the company's financial reports.
86
Pozen also observes that AS2 states that an auditor must apply material-
ity "in an audit of internal controls over financial reporting at both the
financial-statement level and at the individual-balance level.8 7 This "tends
to lead management and auditors to incur tremendous expense by examining
controls over balances that are not financially significant for the company as
a whole-for example, reserve balances in a minor subsidiary, or inventory
balances in a small factory.
8
Finally, Pozen observes that AS2 states that "'[t]here is no difference in
the level of work performed' by the auditors when attesting to manage-
ment's assessment of the company's internal controls, versus when the
auditors express an opinion directly on the effectiveness of the company's
internal controls. ' 89 This aspect of AS2 forces redundancy in the testing
process because "[m]anagement must test all of the company's internal con-
trols" but the auditors can rely on management's testing "only for less
important areas of internal controls."9
Taken together, Pozen's observations suggest that the text of AS2 con-
tains provisions that amplify the rules' tendency to force a focus on obscure
and immaterial process controls and provide a rationale for applying insuffi-
cient processes to audit those controls. This is hardly a recipe for a cost-
efficient regulatory process.
83. Robert C. Pozen, Why Sweat the Small Stuff?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2006, at A20.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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B. A Proposed Solution
The problem generated by the rules' incentive to search for low-
probability/low-magnitude events can be addressed by amending AS2 so
that auditors are required to test only for material weaknesses and not for
significant deficiencies. The definition of a "material weakness" should be
restated as a weakness that creates a likelihood that a material misstatement
will not be prevented or detected at a probability threshold that is meaning-
fully greater than "remote"-for example, to return to the terminology of
AU 325, where there is more than a relatively low level of risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements. If, and to the extent that, AS2
maintains the concept that the aggregation of significant deficiencies can
lead to the existence of a material weakness, then a revision to the likelihood
threshold for material weaknesses should also be combined with a restate-
ment of the definition of the term "significant deficiency." A significant
deficiency should then be understood as a control deficiency that creates a
likelihood that a misstatement will not be prevented or detected at a prob-
ability threshold that is meaningfully more than "remote" and with a
magnitude meaningfully greater than inconsequentiality. The various policy
statements and other exhortations by the Commission and PCAOB are in-
sufficient as long as the rules themselves are hard-wired with definitions that
can easily be used to rationalize processes that test the fringe of remoteness
and inconsequentiality.
This proposed standard would raise the probability threshold above the
level of remoteness and the materiality level above the level of inconsequen-
tiality that now triggers the search for significant deficiencies while still
pursuing inquiries that would catch reasonably possible material failures.
This is an entirely rational point at which to begin the inquiry into the ade-
quacy of controls.
The controls that would no longer be subject to audit under this
modified standard are those where the risk of a material misstatement falls
beneath a relatively low level. Expenditures on these low-likelihood, sub-
material controls can be a significant contributing factor to Section 404
compliance costs. By eliminating the need to address these controls,
compliance costs can be reduced while focusing auditor attention on the
reasonable risk of a material misstatement-which is where the auditors'
attention belongs in the first instance. Such a redefinition would also be
consistent with the PCAOB's own repeated exhortations that the purpose of
the audit is only to obtain a reasonable assurance that no material
weaknesses exist as of the date specified in management's assessment. 9'
91. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE PROCEDURAL Fix
A. A Precise Definition of the Problem
Whatever the substantive definition of the requirements imposed by Sec-
tion 404, simple economic analysis suggests that the audit industry, acting
rationally and in a manner similar to that which would be followed by other
professions subject to analogous economic and social forces, has a powerful
incentive to force their clients to overinvest in Section 404 compliance.
Three distinct factors contribute to this powerful tendency.
First, the audit profession has been thrashed before Congress, in the me-
dia, and in the courts for a range of accounting frauds and restatements.9'
Section 404 requirements create a new set of audit-related demands that can
form the basis for further criticism and additional liability if the audit indus-
try proves too lax in compliance. The easiest way for the industry to avoid
such criticism and liability is to be quite demanding when it comes to Sec-
tion 404 compliance and to interpret any ambiguity in the rules as requiring
the investment of additional resources by audit clients.
Second, the new federal enforcement climate and the threat of class ac-
tion securities fraud litigation create great personal and financial risk for the
profession. A large portion of this financial risk is uninsurable. It is reason-
able for auditors to calculate that requiring clients to purchase additional
Section 404 control processes can reduce the probability that an audit will
result in a litigation claim. Auditors therefore have an incentive to require
that clients continue to spend on Section 404 compliance up until the point
where the marginal benefit to the auditor (not to the client or to society) equals
the marginal cost to the auditor, which could well be zero. The net result is a
surfeit of detailed compliance processes that auditors can point to as consis-
tent with Section 404's ambiguous requirements. These processes can reduce
auditors' litigation exposure but can be hugely wasteful to society.
Third, Section 404 can act as a profit center for the audit industry. Sec-
tion 404 has significantly increased the number of hours billed by the audit
profession, and reports suggest that the first full year of Section 404 compli-
ance was highly profitable for auditors as well as for other providers of
Section 404 services.9 3 To the extent that the audit profession can also in-
crease its profitability by adopting an expansive view of Section 404's
requirements, it would ignore human nature to suggest that these incentives
are irrelevant to the profession's actual conduct.
In addition to these three incentives, a fourth factor must also be consid-
ered in crafting an effective solution to the Section 404 implementation
problem: the inertia of established practices and policies that have evolved
as part of the integrated audit. AS2 encourages integration of the financial
92. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Amy Gunderson, Can't Find an Accountant?, INC., Aug. 2005, at 19; Mark
Jaffe, Sarbanes-Oxley a Boon for Auditors, N.Y. SUN, Nov. 5, 2004, available at
http://www.nysun.com/article/4372; Thomas E. Hartman, The Cost of Being Public in the Era of
Sarbanes-Oxley (June 16, 2005), http://www.fei.org/download/foley6_ I 6_2005.pdf.
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statement audit and the internal control audit.94 In an integrated audit, the
auditor designs and executes procedures that accomplish the objectives of
both audits.95 According to the PCAOB, most auditors were unable to inte-
grate their first-year audits under AS2, due largely to timing constraints.
96
Because of the PCAOB inspection process and client pressure to reduce
costs, the trend towards the integrated audit has continued to gain momen-
tum, and there is evidence to suggest that such integration may be partially
responsible for the decline in second-year costs. 97 Although integration of
the two audits is intended to enhance process efficiency, integration also
raises the possibility that the level of review currently required under AS2
has been "hard-wired" into existing processes. If so, it may be very difficult
to reduce Section 404 compliance costs through amendments to AS2 be-
cause AS2 will no longer apply to a discrete component of the audit process
and the entire integrated audit process will have to be reworked in order to
achieve the necessary efficiencies. The inefficiencies propounded by Section
404's early implementation may already be so well entrenched in the inte-
grated audit process that there is little meaningful hope that an amendment
of AS2, no matter how well crafted, can return the system to a point where
the marginal costs of compliance equal the marginal benefits.
B. A Proposed Solution
The PCAOB is the only organization reasonably positioned to constrain
the audit profession's natural and unavoidable tendency to push clients to
overinvest in Section 404 compliance efforts. The PCAOB should not only
inspect firms for the possibility that they have failed to be sufficiently dili-
gent in reviewing Section 404 compliance, but it should also investigate
whether the firms, in their dealings with audit and nonaudit clients, have
recommended procedures that were not reasonably necessary to comply
with Section 404. As noted earlier, the PCAOB has recently stated that it
will emphasize efficiency in connection with its 2006 inspections. 9 How-
ever, the PCAOB's ability to deter inefficient Section 404 audits will be
constrained until the core definitions that shape Section 404 audits are sub-
stantively amended. Under the current scheme, which rationalizes the search
for processes at the edge that might have a remote possibility of having an
inconsequential effect on the financial statements, it will be difficult to criti-
cize an auditor for suggesting almost any level of process review.
It follows that the recommended procedural reform, which will require
aggressive inspection of audit firms for evidence of overly intrusive Section
94. PCAOB, supra note 5.
95. See PCAOB RELEASE No. 2005-023, supra note 29.
96. Id. at 8.
97. See SEC, Roundtable Discussion of Second-Year Experience with Internal Control Re-
porting and Auditing Provision (May 10, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
soxcomp/soxcomp-transcript.txt).
98. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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404 procedures, cannot be cleanly separated from the recommended sub-
stantive reform, which will require a redefinition of the term "material
weakness" to encompass only those weaknesses that create more than a
relatively low level of risk that a material misstatement will not be prevented
or detected. Again, the PCAOB and the SEC can, without any Congressional
action, implement these amendments. We recognize that there is reason to
question whether the PCAOB can successfully strike the difficult balance
between its primary mission of ensuring that auditors are sufficiently ag-
gressive when auditing clients and its newly articulated goal of preventing
overzealous application of Section 404 requirements.
An additional procedural fix would be to amend AS2 to increase audi-
tors' ability to place reasonable reliance on the work of others, in particular
on the work of a registrant's internal audit function. As currently written,
AS2 provides that "when the auditor uses the work of others, the auditor is
responsible for the results of their work. '" 99 Without incorporating the con-
cept of reasonable reliance, this is in effect a strict liability standard-if the
other party got it wrong, the auditor pays.'0 Under those circumstances, it is
little wonder that auditing firms are reluctant to use the work of others. A
more balanced and appropriate allocation of responsibility would provide
protection for the auditors as long as their reliance on the work of others
was reasonable under the circumstances.
V. THE SMALL COMPANY PROBLEM
The foregoing suggestions have been made without regard to the size of
the issuer. Nevertheless, it is widely recognized that Section 404 imposes
significant fixed costs and that these fixed costs impose particular burdens
on smaller publicly traded issuers.'0 ' The Advisory Committee has described
these burdens as follows:
[Blecause of their different operating structures, smaller public companies
have felt the effects of Section 404 in a manner different from their larger
counterparts. With more limited resources, fewer internal personnel and
less revenue with which to offset both implementation costs and the dis-
proportionate fixed costs of Section 404 compliance, these companies have
been disproportionately subject to the burdens associated with Section 404
compliance. Moreover, the benefits of documenting, testing and certifying
the adequacy of internal controls, while of obvious importance for large
multinational corporations, are of less certain value for smaller public
companies, who rely to a greater degree on "tone at the top" and high-level
99. AS2, supra note 3, 111.
100. Other passages from AS2 that might similarly tend to have an inhibitory effect on audi-
tors' willingness to rely on the work of others are 122, which speaks only of "using the work of
internal auditors to a limited degree:' id. 122, and 126, which, as to information technology
general controls, speaks only of using "the work of others to a moderate extent" and only "so long
as the degree of competence and objectivity of the individuals performing the test is at an appropri-
ate level." Id. 1 126.
101. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 32-35.
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monitoring controls, which may be undocumented and untested, to facili-
tate accurate financial reporting. The result is a cost/benefit equation that,
many believe, diminishes shareholder value, makes smaller public compa-
nies less attractive as investment opportunities and impedes their ability to
compete. 102
As discussed previously, the disproportionate costs incurred by smaller
public companies prompted the Advisory Committee to call for a size-based
exemption from Section 404 requirements unless and until a more scalable,
cost-effective framework is developed.' 3 In opposition to suggestions to
exempt certain classes of issuers from Section 404, critics contend that a
disproportionate percentage of enforcement actions and restatements are
generated by smaller public issuers.'°4 The call for a size-based exemption
has also stoked a debate over whether the Commission has the legal author-
ity to adopt such an exemption.' 5
The small company problem is more fundamental than the broader Sec-
tion 404 debate suggests. If Section 404 rules are rationalized to become
more cost-effective for all issuers, then the Section 404 compliance cost
problem for smaller issuers would be ameliorated but not eliminated. Even
assuming that a perfectly crafted set of Section 404 rules of general applica-
bility can be developed, the smaller company will still face a very
substantial fixed cost compliance component that can render compliance
uneconomical. This fixed cost component of the public company audit is far
higher today than it was before Section 404's adoption.
Further, the Section 404 problem is only part of the regulatory dilemma
faced by the small publicly traded firm. The fixed costs of being a publicly
traded firm have also increased as a result of Sarbanes-Oxley's other provi-
sions, additional regulations adopted by the Commission, tighter listing
standards implemented by the exchanges, and heightened legal and account-
ing costs. 1°7 The stock market analyst settlement has also constrained the
102. Id. at 23-24.
103. See id. at 32-34.
104. See, e.g., Michael Rapoport, Outside Audit: SEC Panel to Turn In Report on Sarbanes
Debate, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2006, at C3 (quoting Damon Silvers, associate general counsel of the
AFL-CIO, stating, "The exemption from [the Section 4041 rules would create a kind of free-fire
zone on investors").
105. For a summary of this debate, see, for example, AFL-CIO: SEC Has No Power to Ex-
empt Firms From SOX Internal Controls Provision, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 101
(Jan. 16, 2006); Oxley, Baker Tell SEC Agency Has Power to Mitigate SOX Provisions, 38 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 449 (Mar. 13, 2006); Sarbanes Defends SOX, Lauds Letter Saying SEC
Lacks Power for 404 Exemptions, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 539 (Mar. 27, 2006).
106. See, e.g., Exposure Draft of Final Report of Advisory Committee on Smaller Public
Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8666, Exchange Act Release No. 53,385, 71 Fed. Reg.
11,090 (Feb. 28, 2006); Amy Feldman, Surviving Sarbanes-Oxley, INC., Sept. 2005, at 132;
Gunderson, supra note 93; Jaffe, supra note 93; Deborah Solomon, Corporate Governance (A Spe-
cial Report); At What Price? Critics say the cost of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley is a lot higher
than it should be, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R3; FIN. EXECUTIVES INT'L, FEI SPECIAL SURVEY
ON SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 IMPLEMENTATION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2004), available at
http://www.404institute.com/docs/SOXSurveyJuly.pdf; Hartman, supra note 93.
107. For a detailed examination of many of these factors, see Carney, supra note 4.
1670 [Vol. 105:1643
Fixing 404
benefits of being a publicly traded firm because the settlement makes it
more difficult for smaller companies to obtain analyst coverage.",
The result of this sudden and significant increase in compliance costs
and reduction in analyst coverage is twofold. First, one cadre of smaller
firms rationally entered the public markets at a time when compliance costs
were lower and, given today's cost and risk environment, would rationally
decide not to be publicly traded for a multitude of reasons separate and dis-
tinct from Section 404.'09 Second, the probability that a new start-up firm
will be able to go public successfully is materially lower today than in the
past because the minimum scale required of a new start-up has increased
significantly."0 As a consequence, venture capitalists and other backers of
private, start-up firms should expect fewer liquidity events through initial
public offerings and lower rates of return from entrepreneurial investing
activities than they would otherwise observe.
Three potential solutions to the small company problem are available.
The first is to provide already-public companies with an efficient means of
delisting from the public markets as recommended by the Advisory Com-
mittee.'" It is wasteful and not in shareholders' best interests for these
companies to continue to be saddled with socially inefficient compliance
costs. Publicly traded companies can eliminate the obligation to comply
with Section 404 and other Sarbanes-Oxley obligations either by going pri-
vate or by "going dark." In a going-private transaction, the company's shares
are typically acquired by a privately held entity or control group and, as a
consequence of the acquisition, the company ceases to be a publicly traded
entity. When a company "goes dark" it reduces the number of its sharehold-
ers to less than 300, terminates its reporting obligations under the Exchange
Act, and continues to trade on the "pink sheets" in a market that is generally
less liquid than the NASDAQ or NYSE. "The process of 'going dark'
through termination of reporting under the securities laws is said to impose
a liquidity penalty of about ten percent upon announcement."'"1 2 One ap-
proach to this problem would be a regulatory initiative designed to facilitate
going private or going dark transitions by companies that have been caught
in this regulatory phase shift combined with an initiative designed to im-
prove the functioning of the pink sheet markets.
Foreign issuers face challenges that are quite similar to those faced by
smaller public issuers. The Commission recently reproposed a rule to facili-
tate termination of Exchange Act reporting obligations by foreign issuers
108. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 72 (recommending adoption of policies that en-
courage and promote the dissemination of research on smaller public companies).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Rebecca Buckman & Kara Scannell, Venture Capital: Do U.S. Regulations
Drive Away Start-Ups?; Sarbanes-Oxley Deters IPOs, Say Venture Capitalists, Who Seek Changes
in Law, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2006, at C5.
111. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 91.
112. Carney, supra note 4, at 143, (citing Claudia H. Deutsch, The Higher Price of Staying
Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2005, § 3, at 5).
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where the average daily trading volume of the issuer's securities in the
United States was no greater than five percent of such trading volume in its
primary trading market over a recent twelve-month period."3
A second solution is to provide further and continued exemptions as rec-
ommended by the Advisory Committee. 114
A third solution is to write a separate set of rules only applicable in
situations where the company is sufficiently small that the Commission con-
cludes that the costs of compliance would likely exceed the benefits even
under an amended, more cost-effective AS2 regime." 5 These "404-lite" rules
would be designed to impose minimal costs on small company issuers over
and above the costs incurred to obtain a competent audit. Further, in consid-
ering the thresholds that might trigger the application of 404-lite, the
Commission might wish to consider revenue triggers as well as market capi-
talization triggers as the Advisory Committee has recommended.' 6 Issuers
with relatively low revenues sometimes have high market capitalizations,
and a cost efficient control environment would be more aptly addressed by
the 404-lite rules. A test based exclusively on market capitalization would
not address these situations.
Following the receipt of its Advisory Committee's recommendations, the
Commission has taken a number of meaningful and encouraging steps to
address the plight of the smaller public company in the context of Section
404. As noted above, the Commission has recently proposed extending
again the Section 404 compliance date for nonaccelerated filers, and it has
provided relief for issuers undertaking initial public offerings such that Sec-
tion 404 compliance will not be mandated until the issuer has filed at least
one annual report with the Commission. " '
CONCLUSION
Tinkering around the edges will not remedy the problems caused by
Section 404 as implemented by AS2. As now drafted, AS2 guarantees a
113. Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer's Registration of a Class of Securities Under
Section 12 (g) and Duty to File Reports Under Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Exchange Act Release No. 55,005, 72 Fed. Reg. 7 (Dec. 13, 2006).
114. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 43, 48.
115. See id. at 50 (discussing a proposal along the lines recommended by the Advisory Com-
mittee).
116. See id. at 44.
117. See White, supra note 48. On September 29, 2006, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox
reiterated the Commission's support of the Advisory Committee's Section 404 recommendations:
Finally, I want all who are listening to this to know that the Commission is working to imple-
ment the important recommendations from the SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Public
Companies last April. In particular, we have adopted the Committee's recommendation on
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, that unless and until a framework for assessing internal control
over financial reporting for smaller companies is developed that recognizes their characteris-
tics and needs, smaller companies will get relief from Section 404.
Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech to the SEC Government-Business Forum on Small Busi-
ness Capital Formation (Sept. 29, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch092906cc.htm.
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compliance regime in which the marginal costs of compliance far exceed the
marginal benefits, causing the waste of billions of dollars on inefficient im-
plementations of Section 404 controls. As a necessary first step to reform,
the PCAOB and the SEC should amend AS2's core definition of "material
weakness" and consider eliminating the requirement to focus on "significant
deficiencies." These definitional changes will help force auditors to focus
exclusively on controls that have a reasonable probability of causing a mate-
rial misstatement or omission in a financial statement. This amendment to
AS2's substantive requirements must also be complemented by aggressive
PCAOB oversight designed to counteract the understandable tendency in the
audit profession to cause overinvestment in Section 404 controls.
We are not confident that these or any other reforms will be sufficient to
undo the problems caused by Section 404. The audit industry has already, in
accordance with PCAOB recommendations, incorporated current Section
404 practices into integrated audit procedures applied in connection with
non-404 audits. Unless the steps taken by the SEC and PCAOB are powerful
enough to cause a significant reengineering of the integrated audit process,
any effort at bringing Section 404's costs more into line with its benefits
will have limited success at best.
Fixing 404 will not be easy. AS2 will have to be reengineered from the
bottom up, and the PCAOB will have to adopt a monitoring style that runs
counter to its primary mission. The Commission and the PCAOB must not
show any timidity at all in addressing these problems, particularly because
they will be required to act in the face of the predictable opposition of
groups with a vested interest in preserving a rigorous Section 404 compli-
ance environment without regard to the cost-benefit tradeoffs involved in
implementing Section 404. Absent such reform, America's shareholders will
have to resign themselves to a future in which publicly traded corporations
are systematically forced to waste billions of dollars on control processes
that simply don't generate marginal benefits in excess of their marginal
costs, and in which start-up firms will find it less attractive to list their
shares on public markets and foreign firms less appealing to cross-list their
shares in U.S. markets. The choice is for the Commission and PCAOB to
make, but the evidence in favor of fundamental reform seems powerful in-
deed.
POSTSCRIPT
Early drafts of this Article were broadly circulated within the PCAOB
and SEC, and, in a set of December 2006 releases, both agencies suggested
that they would be taking steps consistent with this Article's recommenda-
tions. Most notably, the PCAOB announced that it was seeking comment on
a new Auditing Standard No. 5 that would supersede its Auditing Standard
No. 2.' 8 The proposed new standard would, among other matters, be a "[r]e-
118. PCAOB, RELEASE No. 2006-007, PROPOSED AUDITING STANDARD, AN AUDIT OF IN-
TERNAL CONTROLS OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING THAT IS INTEGRATED WITH AN AUDIT OF
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articulation of the definition of material weakness to exclude significant
deficiency."" 9 The PCAOB explained that this amendment was desirable
because reference to the notion of significant deficiency within the defini-
tion of material weakness "has raised concern that auditors may be
performing their audits at a level of detail necessary to ensure that their pro-
cedures identify all significant deficiencies, rather than only material
weaknesses."
'
'
20
The PCAOB also recognized that defining a significant deficiency as a
control deficiency "that has a more than remote likelihood of resulting in a
misstatement that is more than inconsequential"' 2 ' can cause companies and
auditors to "spend excess time identifying, discussing and fixing deficien-
cies that are not sufficiently important to the company's overall system of
internal control."'2 It therefore proposes to "replace[] the term 'more than
inconsequential' with the term 'significant' and define[] 'significant' as 'less
than material yet important enough to merit attention by those responsible
for oversight of the company's financial reporting.' ,"23
Much in the same vein, the PCAOB observed that reliance on the phrase
"more than remote" may have caused some auditors and issuers to "misun-
derst[and] the term 'more than remote' to mean something significantly less
likely than a reasonable possibility. This, in turn, may have caused these
issuers and auditors to evaluate the likelihood of a misstatement at a much
lower threshold than the Board intended."'' 24 To deter this form of behavior,
the PCAOB proposes to replace the reference to "more than remote likeli-
hood" with "reasonable possibility" within the definitions of both material
weakness and significant deficiency. 12' The PCAOB calculates the impact of
this change as follows:
To the extent that the term 'more than remote' has resulted in auditors and
issuers evaluating likelihood at a more stringent level than originally in-
tended, this change should significantly improve the evaluation of
deficiencies such that material weaknesses, when they are identified, are
indeed the deficiencies that are most important. '
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 1 (2006), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket 021/2006-
12-19_ReleaseNo._2006-007.pdf [hereinafter PCAOB RELEASE No. 2006-007]. In drafting
Accounting Standard No. 5, the PCAOB also attempted to address all of the points in Recommenda-
tion I11I.S.1 of the Advisory Committee's report relating to improving internal control auditing.
Audio file: PCAOB, Open Board Meeting Webcast (Dec. 19, 2006), http://www.connectlive.com/
events/pcaob.
119. PCAOB RELEASE No. 2006-007, supra note 118, at 10.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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The proposed new standard would also permit auditors to increase their
reliance on knowledge obtained during previous audits and to avoid replicat-
ing procedures to the extent that they may have already occurred. 27 It would
also reduce the barriers to having auditors rely on the work of others and
eliminate the separate requirement to evaluate management's annual evalua-
tion process.121
As for concerns about Section 404's effects on smaller issuers, the pro-
posed new rule includes an exhortation that "the auditor should scale the
audit so that it is appropriate for the company's size and complexity," but
does not otherwise articulate a distinct set of audit requirements that would
apply to smaller issuers. "9 In the PCAOB's view, no distinct standards are
necessary because "the proposals' reliance on principles rather than detailed
instruction [will] require auditors to consider each company's unique facts
and circumstances before determining how to apply the standard.""'3 This
individual attention, combined with changes in the standard that focus "the
auditor on the most important controls ... should together make the audit
more scalable for any company.
'1 31
The SEC also recognized that there has been an "overly conservative
application of the Commission rules and PCAOB Auditing Standard No.
2.' ' 32 The Commission therefore proposed to provide guidance to manage-
ment conducting reviews of the internal controls over financial reporting.
The guidance suggests "a top-down, risk-based approach that allows for the
exercise of significant judgment so that management can design and conduct
an evaluation that is tailored to its company's individual circumstances'
'
,
3
and is organized around two broad principles. The first emphasizes the need
to focus on whether a control issue "adequately address[es] the risk that a
material misstatement in the financial statements would not be prevented or
detected in a timely manner."'' 34 Control issues that are not material need not
be a focus of attention. "The second principle is that management's evalua-
tion of evidence about the operation of its controls should be based on its
assessment of risk""' in a manner that should allow management to use
"more efficient approaches to gathering evidence, such as self-assessments,
in low-risk areas and perform more extensive testing in high risk areas.'
' 36
127. Id. at 18-20.
128. Id. at 14, 21-25.
129. Id. at 29.
130. Id. at 28.
131. Id.
132. Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, 71 Fed. Reg.
77,635, 77,637 (proposed Dec. 20, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240, 241), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2006/33-8762.pdf.
133. id. at 77,639-40.
134. Id. at 77,639.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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As was the case with the PCAOB, the Commission adopted no special
rules for smaller issuers. Instead, the Commission observed that its broader
interpretive position should benefit "companies of all sizes and complexi-
ties"'' 37 and "encourage smaller public companies to take advantage of the
flexibility and scalability of [the Commission's new] approach to conduct an
efficient evaluation of internal control over financial reporting."
' 38
In all, these proposed amendments are highly responsive to this Article's
substantive proposals and suggest that the PCAOB and SEC are likely to
adopt an analysis essentially identical to ours. These new releases are, how-
ever, silent about the vigor with which the PCAOB intends to pursue
evidence that auditors have engaged in inefficient processes. As a practical
matter, it will probably be impossible to form any view as to the PCAOB's
commitment to fight wasteful implementations absent a few years of practi-
cal experience in the field. Thus, to the extent that efficient implementation
of Section 404 requires vigilant oversight by the PCAOB combined with a
new set of core definitions, it is premature to conclude that the PCAOB's
and SEC's proposals will be sufficient to resolve the efficiency problems
created by the Section 404 implementing regulations.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 77,640.
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